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Abstract—In this work we study the reliability and secrecy
performance achievable by practical low-density parity-check
(LDPC) codes over the Gaussian wiretap channel. While several
works have already addressed this problem in asymptotic condi-
tions, i.e., under the hypothesis of codewords of infinite length,
only a few approaches exist for the finite length regime. We pro-
pose an approach to measure the performance of practical codes
and compare it with that achievable in asymptotic conditions.
Moreover, based on the secrecy metrics we adopt to achieve this
target, we propose a code optimization algorithm which allows
to design irregular LDPC codes able to approach the ultimate
performance limits even at moderately small codeword lengths
(in the order of 10000 bits).
I. INTRODUCTION
Coding for the Gaussian wiretap channel is a well-
established research topic, but there are some partially un-
solved and challenging problems. One of these problems is
to study the secrecy performance in the finite code length
regime, and to design optimized finite length codes. One of
the most common metrics to assess the performance of finite
length codes used for transmissions is the average bit error rate
(BER) achieved by using some (possibly optimal) decoder. On
the other hand, the secrecy performance over wiretap channels
is classically measured using information-theoretic metrics,
like the secrecy capacity, and in asymptotic conditions (e.g.,
infinite code length and random coding).
For example, in [1], the authors consider a discrete mem-
oryless channel (DMC) (that is, a binary erasure channel
(BEC) or binary symmetric channel (BSC)) model for both
the main and wiretapper’s channels, and design optimized
regular LDPC codes for these channels. They show that their
approach achieves the secrecy capacity when the wiretap
channel consists of symmetric DMCs. No continuous channels
are considered, and the secrecy capacity is achieved in the
asymptotic regime (i.e., with infinite length codes).
The BER as a secrecy metric has instead been used in [2],
where a coding scheme able to achieve a BER very close to 0.5
for the eavesdropper and very low for the authorized channel
is proposed. In [2], the authors use differential evolution to
design optimized LDPC codes able to achieve the desired BER
targets while keeping the quality ratio between the main and
the eavesdropper’s channels (named security gap) as small as
possible. The proposed coding scheme is based on puncturing
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and, thanks to the BER-based analysis, is applicable at finite
block lengths. A similar solution, but without the need of
puncturing, has been proposed in [3], and extended in [4] to
the case of parallel channels.
A bridge between information theoretic and error rate-
based secrecy measures is presented in [5], where however
the main goal is to propose a secret key sharing scheme for
the wiretap channel, and the presence of an error-free public
channel between the source and destination is considered,
which helps the secret sharing process. By using regular LDPC
codes, the authors show that the key capacity can be achieved
in the asymptotic regime. Irregular LDPC codes are instead
considered for the finite code length regime, and a density
evolution based linear program is used to design them. The
same approach is followed in [6] to assess the performance of
punctured LDPC codes over the Gaussian wiretap channel.
Inspired by such works, in this paper we study the perfor-
mance of finite length LDPC codes over the Gaussian wiretap
channel, by defining suitable metrics to assess how far they are
from optimality, which is achieved in asymptotic conditions.
This permits us to explore the capacity-equivocation regions
of these codes in the finite length regime, and without using
puncturing. We also propose a twofold code optimization tool
which allows to design optimal codes in terms of the consid-
ered metrics. Similar twofold code optimizations have been
proposed for the relay channel [7]–[9], but no solution has
been presented for the wiretap channel, at our best knowledge.
We show that our approach allows to achieve great flexibility
in the choice of the system parameters, as well as higher
security levels with respect to previous solutions based on
punctured LDPC codes [6].
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section
II we present the system model and the metrics we use to
assess performance in asymptotic and finite length conditions.
In Section III we describe the code design requirements. In
Section IV we propose our code optimization approach. In
Section V we provide and discuss some numerical results.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND METRICS
We consider the classical Gaussian wiretap channel model,
in which a sender, named Alice, transmits a secret message
M. She encodes her message into the n-symbol codeword Xn,
which uniquely depends on M and on some random message
R generated by Alice. We consider binary coding, therefore
Xn actually is an n-bit codeword. If the secret message is ks
bits long and the random message is kr bits long, the code
rate is Rc = (ks + kr)/n = k/n. The secret message rate,
instead, is Rs = ks/n.
Transmission occurs over a Gaussian channel for both the
authorized receiver, named Bob, and the eavesdropper, named
Eve. The noisy codewords received by Bob and Eve are
denoted by Y n and Zn, respectively. In order to achieve
successful transmission of M over this channel, both the
following targets must be fulfilled:
i) M must be reliably decoded by Bob, i.e., with a
sufficiently small error rate (reliability target),
ii) the information about M gathered by Eve must be
sufficiently small (security target).
Concerning the reliability target, in ideal conditions (i.e.,
infinite code length and random coding) the channel capacity
can be used as the ultimate code rate limit. In the finite length
regime, instead, a practical code must be designed to allow
Bob to achieve a sufficiently low error rate in decoding the
secret message. Concerning the security target, some classical
information theoretic secrecy metrics are only useful in the
asymptotic regime. In fact, denoting by I(x; y) the mutual
information between x and y, we have [10]:
• Strong secrecy when the total amount of information
leaked about M through observing Zn goes to zero as n
goes to infinity, i.e., lim
n→∞
I(M;Zn) = 0.
• Weak secrecy when the rate of information leaked about
M through observing Zn goes to zero as n goes to
infinity, i.e., lim
n→∞ I(M;Z
n)/n = 0.
So, these metrics are not useful in order to assess the perfor-
mance in finite length conditions and compare it with that in
the asymptotic regime.
However, another metric can be exploited, which was
already used in Wyner’s original work [11]. According to
[11], transmission is accomplished in perfect secrecy when
the wiretapper equivocation rate on the secret message, Re =
1
n
H(M|Zn), with H(·) denoting the entropy function, equals
the entropy of the data source. We consider independent and
identically distributed secret messages, therefore the source
entropy rate is equal to Rs. So, perfect secrecy is achieved
when the equivocation rate Re equals the secret message rate
Rs, i.e.,
R˜e = Re/Rs = 1. (1)
R˜e is called fractional equivocation rate.
Actually, the ultimate limit achievable by the equivocation
rate is the secrecy capacity Cs = CB − CE , where CB and
CE are Bob’s and Eve’s channel capacities, respectively. For
a binary-input channel with additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) γ, the capacity is
given by the following expression:
C (γ) = 1− 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−
(y−√γ)2
2 log2
(
1 + e−2y
√
γ
)
dy.
(2)
Then, the target is to maximize Re in such a way as to
approach the secrecy capacity. On the other hand, when
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Fig. 1. Wiretap channel model employed in the study.
considering finite length codes, it is expected that Cs < Rs
and another valuable issue is the evaluation of the gap between
the secret message rate and the secrecy capacity. Numerical
examples will be presented in Section V.
Concerning the computation of the equivocation rate, it can
be shown that [6]:
Re =
1
n
[H(Xn)− I(Xn;Zn) + H(M|Zn, Xn)
−H(Xn|M, Zn)] .
(3)
From (3) it results that this formulation of Eve’s equivocation
rate requires to compute the quantity H(Xn|M, Zn), that is,
the entropy of Xn conditioned to receiving Zn and knowing
the secret message M. Eve obviously does not know the
secret message, therefore we suppose the existence of another
(fictitious) receiver in the same position as Eve’s, knowing the
secret message M. We denote such a receiver as Frank: he
receives the same vector Zn as Eve but, differently from Eve,
he has perfect knowledge of the secret message M. Then,
he tries to decode Zn for recovering the random message R,
which is the only source of uncertainty for Frank in order
to reconstruct Xn. The resulting wiretap channel model is
schematically depicted in Fig. 1. The letter M inside Alice’s
and Frank’s boxes points out that the message is known to
both Alice and Frank.
Let us suppose that, in these conditions, Frank experiences
a decoding error probability (or codeword error rate (CER))
equal to η. By Fano inequality we have H(Xn|M, Zn) ≤
1 + krη. We also have H(Xn) = k and H(M|Zn, Xn) ≤
H(M|Xn) = 0. Concerning Eve’s channel mutual information
I(Xn;Zn), we could obtain a tight upper bound on it as
proposed in [12], by taking into account the code length
and the target error rate. However, by using the classical
bound I(Xn;Zn) ≤ nCE , we obtain a limit value which
is independent of Eve’s error rate. Such a value cannot
be overcome even if Eve’s error rate changes, therefore it
represents a conservative choice for our purposes. Based on
these considerations, we can find a lower bound on Eve’s
equivocation rate about the secret message as [6]:
Re ≥ 1
n
[k − nCE − krη − 1] =
= Rc − CE − (Rc −Rs)η − 1
n
= R∗e .
(4)
By looking at (4), it is evident that this metric is well
suited to assess the secrecy performance of practical, finite
length codes. In fact, the code length is taken into account,
and the error rate experienced by Frank can be estimated
for practical codes through numerical simulations. Its value
obviously depends on Frank’s SNR, which is the same as
Eve’s, and therefore, according to (2), it determines CE . It
follows that, for a fixed code length and rate, the equivocation
rate can be maximized by optimizing the choice of the pair
(η, CE).
III. CODE DESIGN
An LDPC code with rate Rc = k/n is defined through its
parity-check matrix H of size (n− k)× n. Alternatively, the
LDPC code can be represented through a Tanner graph, that
is a bipartite graph composed of variable and check nodes,
which correspond to the codeword bits and the parity-check
equations, respectively. Noting by hij the (i, j)-th element of
H, there is an edge between the j-th variable node and the
i-th check node iff hij = 1. The number of edges connected
to a node is called degree of that node. The following two
polynomials are commonly used to denote the variable and
check node degree distributions:
λ(x) =
dv∑
i=2
λix
i−1, ρ(x) =
dc∑
j=2
ρjx
j−1 (5)
where dv and dc are the maximum variable and check node
degrees, respectively. In λ (x) (ρ (x)), the coefficient λi (ρj)
coincides with the fraction of edges connected to the variable
(check) nodes having degree i (j). Therefore, λ(x) and ρ(x)
are defined from the edge perspective. The code rate can be
expressed as:
Rc = 1−
∑dv
i=2 ρi/i∑dc
j=2 λj/j
. (6)
The most common LDPC code decoding algorithm, which
is an instance of the well-known belief propagation principle,
is based on the exchange of soft messages about each received
bit between the nodes of its Tanner graph. Therefore, the
performance of an LDPC code depends on the connections
among the nodes of its Tanner graph. Indeed, a variable node
with a greater number of connected edges has more parity-
check equations which verify its associated bit. On the other
hand, check nodes with low degrees correspond to parity-
check equations with less unknowns. The optimization of the
code performance under message passing decoding consists
in finding the best tradeoff between these two effects, and
this usually requires irregular degree distributions. The well-
known density evolution algorithm, proposed in [13], aims
at optimizing the pair (λ(x), ρ(x)) based on the statistics
of the decoder messages. However, differently from classical
transmission problems, in our setting the same code (chosen
by Alice) is used by three receivers: Bob, Eve and Frank, and
the code optimization should take this into account.
Let us consider a systematic encoder and let us suppose
that the transmitted codeword is c = [M|R|P ], where M is
the ks-bit secret message, R is the kr-bit random message
and P is the r-bit redundancy vector added by the encoder.
BAH = 
ks kr r
C
Fig. 2. Parity-check matrix of the considered codes.
Obviously, systematic encoding shall be avoided in security
applications, especially if source coding is not optimal. In
fact, in such a case, Eve could look at the systematic part of
the received codeword and gather some information about the
secret message parts which are less affected by errors. In prac-
tical systems, systematic encoding can be easily avoided by
scrambling the information bits prior to encoding [3]. Having
this clearly in mind, for our code design and analysis purposes
it is convenient to keep the assumption of systematic encoding.
Under this hypothesis, the code parity-check matrix can be
divided into three blocks as shown in Fig. 2, corresponding
to the three parts of the codeword c. Bob must use the whole
matrix to decode for both the secret and random messages
(since he does not know in advance any of them), although
in the end he is interested only in M. Eve is in the same
condition, although she receives the signal through a different
channel. Frank, instead, has perfect knowledge of M, and
only needs to decode for R. Therefore, he can precompute
A ·MT = s, were T denotes transposition. Then, he can use
s as a syndrome vector and focus on the reduced parity-check
system:
[B|C] · [R|P ]T = H′ · c′T = s.
Obviously, decoding for a vector having an all-zero syn-
drome or a different syndrome is equivalent, due to the code
linearity. Hence, Frank performs decoding through the LDPC
code defined by H′, having rate RF = kr/(kr+ r). The code
rate for Bob instead coincides with the overall code rate, i.e.,
RB = k/n. It follows that RF = RB−Rs1−Rs . In the setting we
consider, it is important that both Bob’s and Frank’s codes
are optimized. In fact, an optimized code for Bob allows to
approach the channel capacity, which is the ultimate limit for
the reliability target. An optimized code for Frank instead
serves to achieve the desired η with the smallest possible SNR.
Since Frank’s SNR is the same as Eve’s, this reduces Eve’s
channel capacity CE .
IV. CODE OPTIMIZATION
We propose an optimization strategy for Bob’s and Frank’s
codes based on the density evolution algorithm, which is com-
monly used to optimize a single code, with some modifications
in order to consider the joint optimization target. In Section
IV-A we briefly recall the steps of the single code optimization
and then in Section IV-B we describe our strategy for the
joint code optimization. In this work, as in [13], we use the
density evolution algorithm with Gaussian approximation of
the decoder messages.
A. Single optimization
The density evolution algorithm is well-known in the liter-
ature; therefore, for the sake of brevity, we report here only
the main equations of [13], as they are used in the proposed
joint code optimization.
Given ρ(x), Rc and dv , the optimization of λ(x) of a single
code is possible by applying the following constraints:
C1 - Rate constraint:
dv∑
i=2
λi
i
=
1
1−Rc
dc∑
i=2
ρi
i
. (7)
C2 - Proportion distribution constraint:
dv∑
i=2
λi = 1. (8)
C3 - Convergence constraint (from [13, Eq. (16)]):
r > h(s, r), ∀r ∈ (0, φ(s)) (9)
where s = 2
σ2
, σ2 being the noise variance, and φ(·) will
be defined in (12). For 0 < s < ∞ and 0 < r ≤ 1, we
define h(s, r) in (9) as follows:
h(s, r) =
dv∑
i=2
λihi(s, r) (10)
where
hi(s, r) = φ
s+ (i− 1) dc∑
j=2
ρjφ
−1
(
1− (1− r)j−1
) .
(11)
In (9) and (11),
φ(x) =
{
1− 1√
4pix
∫ +∞
−∞ tanh
u
2 e
− (u−x)24x du, if x > 0
1, if x = 0.
(12)
Condition (9) is equivalent to impose that rl(s)→ 0 for
l →∞ [13], with rl = h(s, rl−1) and r0 = φ(s).
C4 - Stability condition:
λ2 <
e
1
2σ2∑dc
j=2 ρj(j − 1)
. (13)
In the single code optimization, the code threshold s∗ is
defined as the minimum s for which the constraints [C1−C4]
are satisfied. From the definition of s, it is evident that s∗
corresponds to the maximum noise variance σ2 for which the
constraints are verified.
B. Joint optimization
In order to perform the joint optimization of Bob’s and
Frank’s codes, we must impose that Frank’s code is somehow
contained in Bob’s code (in other terms, that Frank’s parity-
check matrix is a sub-matrix of Bob’s parity-check matrix).
Therefore, in addition to the constraints in Section IV-A, we
need another condition. To obtain this further constraint, we
introduce the polynomial λ˜(x) which corresponds to the node
perspective of λ(x). In λ˜(x), the fraction of nodes of degree
i can be derived from λ(x) through the following formula:
λ˜i =
λi/i∑dv
k=2 λk/k
. (14)
In order to obtain the check node degree distributions from the
node perspective ρ˜(x), a similar formula can be applied to the
check nodes degree distributions from the edge perspective.
This can be easily achieved by replacing in (14) λ(x) with
ρ(x), λ˜(x) with ρ˜(x) and dv with dc.
Since Bob’s parity-check matrix contains Frank’s parity-
check matrix, the number of variable nodes in Bob’s Tanner
graph having some fixed degree must be greater than or equal
to that of variable nodes in Frank’s Tanner graph having the
same degree. Hence, we must take into account the following
further constraint:
C5 - Joint optimization constraint:
λ˜B,i ≥ λ˜F,i, ∀i ∈
[
2, 3, 4, . . . , d(F )v
]
, (15)
where λ˜B(x) and λ˜F (x) are Bob’s and Frank’s variable node
degree distributions from the node perspective, respectively,
and d(F )v is Frank’s maximum variable node degree. C5 adds
to [C1 − C4] and the optimum λB(x) must satisfy all these
constraints.
In the joint optimization algorithm, we define the conver-
gence threshold as the maximum of c = σ2B + σ2F , denoted
by c∗, for which the constraints [C1 − C5] are satisfied. In
the expression of c, σ2B and σ2F are Bob’s and Frank’s noise
variances, respectively. It should be noted that this procedure
differs from optimizing the two codes separately. In fact, in
principle, we could first optimize Frank’s code, and then try to
optimize Bob’s code by taking account the degree distributions
obtained for Frank and the constraint C5. This, however,
could impose too strong constraints on Bob’s code degree
distribution, thus preventing to find a good solution for him,
too. In fact, some solutions may exist for which neither Bob’s
nor Frank’s degree distributions are individually optimal, but
their joint performance is optimal.
As in [13], in order to design the check node degree
distribution, we adopt a concentrated distribution (i.e., with
only two degrees, concentrated around the mean). It is widely
recognized that this solution, though very simple, is able
to achieve very good performance. Hence, for each pair
(λF (x), λB(x)), we obtain the pair (ρ˜F (x), ρ˜B(x)) by using
the following formula, valid for both Bob and Frank:
ρ˜(x) = ax⌊cm⌋ + bx⌈cm⌉, (16)
where cm = Er =
∑
j
λ˜j ·j
(1−Rc) and E is the total number of edges
in the Tanner graph. The values a and b are computed as
a = ⌈cm⌉ − cm, b = cm − ⌊cm⌋. (17)
In (16) and (17), ⌈cm⌉ and ⌊cm⌋ represent the ceiling and
floor value of cm, respectively.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In order to provide some practical examples, we use the
procedure described in Section IV-B to design several codes
with d(B)v = d(F )v = 50. We consider code rates Rc = RB =
0.35, 0.5, 0.75 and several values of Rs < RB . The degree
distributions obtained through the joint optimization procedure
are reported in Table I. Concerning the choice of the degrees
of x allowed in the two polynomials, the only constraints we
impose are that they must not overcome the maximum values
d
(B)
v and d(F )v , and that the number of nodes of degree 2 must
be such that the stability condition (13) is met by both codes.
To provide some examples of finite length codes, we con-
sider LDPC codes with length n1 = 10000 and n2 = 50000;
Frank’s code length is then obtained from these values by
considering the submatrix H′. Once having defined the degree
distributions, the parity-check matrices are designed through
the Progressive Edge Growth (PEG) algorithm [14]. The
numerical results are obtained by considering, for all coding
schemes, binary phase shift keying (BPSK) modulation over
the AWGN channel. When considering finite length codes,
through numerical simulations we are able to determine the
values of the SNR per bit (Eb/N0) that ensure a given CER.
These values are reported in Table II, for both Bob and Frank,
assuming CER = 10−2 and several values of Rs. In the table,
the values of Eb
N0
∣∣∣
th
identify the codes convergence thresholds
obtained through density evolution. These values represent
the ultimate performance bounds achievable in asymptotic
conditions (i.e., infinite code length). The values of Eb
N0
∣∣∣
n1
and
Eb
N0
∣∣∣
n2
instead represent the SNR working points, estimated
through simulations, for the practical codes with lengths n1
and n2, respectively. We observe from Table II that, for Bob’s
code, the finite length performance approaches the asymptotic
threshold as the code rate increases. Indeed, for RB = 0.75
and code length equal to n1 and n2, the gap between the
asymptotic threshold and the finite length codes performance
is about 0.4 dB and 0.2 dB, respectively.
As a security metric we use the lower bound R∗e on the
equivocation rate, computed according to (4) and the values in
Table II. The secrecy capacity Cs, that represents the ultimate
limit achievable by the equivocation rate, is also computed for
the cases of interest, and used as a benchmark. We compute
Cs under the hypothesis of ideal coding, i.e., that Bob’s and
Frank’s code rates coincide with the respective channel ca-
pacities. Since Frank’s and Eve’s channels coincide, it follows
that Cs = RB−RF = Rs 1−RB1−Rs . In order to assess if practical
codes can approach the perfect secrecy condition (1), we
then compute the fractional lower bound on the equivocation
rate R˜∗e = R
∗
e/Rs both in asymptotic conditions and in the
finite code length regime, and compare its values with the
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for code length n2, as a
function of Rs.
fractional secrecy capacity C˜s = Cs/Rs = 1−RB1−Rs . The values
so obtained are reported in Fig. 3, for the same values of
Rs considered in Tables I and II. As an example, for the
considered code parameters and Rs = 0.725, we find that in
asymptotic conditions the designed codes approach the secrecy
capacity and the perfect secrecy condition. Notably, even using
relatively short codes, with 10000-bit codewords, the fractional
equivocation rate is close to 0.8. For the sake of comparison,
we consider some results reported in [6] for the scheme
based on punctured LDPC codes. The corresponding points
are marked with an asterisk in Fig. 3. Those results consider
codes with length n = 106, at which the performance of LDPC
codes usually approaches the density evolution threshold.
However, the asymptotic performance achieved by the degree
distributions found through the proposed approach exhibits
some gain at the same secret message rates. Furthermore, for
Rs = 0.43, even our schemes with n = 10000 and n = 50000
outperform that proposed in [6] with n = 106.
From Fig. 3 it results that the best performance in terms of
Eve’s equivocation rate is achieved when the secret message
rate approaches the code rate. This could seem counterintu-
itive, since suggests to use few random bits to confuse the
eavesdropper. However, in this condition RF is small and
Frank is able to reach the desired performance at low SNR.
The latter coincides with Eve’s channel SNR, therefore Eve’s
equivocation rate is large. On the other hand, imposing that
Eve’s channel has a too low SNR is not realistic, therefore
some randomness shall always be used in order to relax the
constraints on Eve’s channel quality.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the performance of practical LDPC coded
transmissions over the Gaussian wiretap channel. By using
suitable reliability and security metrics, we have computed
performance bounds in the asymptotic regime and assessed
the achievable performance under the hypothesis of finite
TABLE I
DEGREES DISTRIBUTION PAIRS OBTAINED WITH THE TECHNIQUE DESCRIBED IN SECTION IV-B FOR SEVERAL VALUES OF Rs AND RB .
Rs 0.33 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.725
RB 0.35 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
i λF,i λB,i λF,i λB,i λF,i λB,i λF,i λB,i λF,i λB,i λF,i λB,i λF,i λB,i
2 0.6677 0.1858 0.4208 0.2259 0.6181 0.2070 0.2187 0.1588 0.2066 0.1382 0.4257 0.1712 0.6181 0.1300
3 0.2279 0.2291 0.1656 0.1701 0.2117 0.2123 0.1826 0.1851 0.1436 0.1549 0.1763 0.1787 0.2117 0.2128
4 - - 0.1192 0.1195 - - - - 0.0280 0.0278 0.1014 0.1029 - -
5 - - - - 0.1445 0.1471 0.0497 0.0449 0.0123 0.0112 - - 0.1445 0.1786
6 0.0267 0.0252 - - 0.0246 0.0254 0.0365 0.0378 0.0248 0.0267 - - 0.0246 0.0354
7 0.0767 0.0751 - - - - 0.0309 0.0317 0.0999 0.1054 - - - -
8 - - 0.0057 0.0061 - - 0.1662 0.1683 - - - - - -
9 - - - - - - - - 0.0539 0.0574 0.1321 0.1410 - -
10 - - 0.2877 0.2907 - - - - 0.0413 0.0409 0.1635 0.1639 - -
11 - 0.0249 - - - - - - 0.0144 0.0175 - - - -
12 - 0.1792 - - - - - - 0.0126 0.0119 - - - -
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.0359
14 - - - - - 0.0184 - - - - - - - 0.0625
15 - - - - - 0.2779 - - - - - - - 0.1561
19 - - - - - - - - 0.0637 0.0713 - - - -
20 - - - - - - 0.0154 0.0124 0.0050 0.0190 - - - 0.0031
21 - - - 0.0096 - - 0.0747 0.0954 - - - - - 0.0103
22 - - - - - - 0.0666 0.0659 - - - - - 0.0014
23 - - - - - 0.1109 0.0568 0.0549 - - - - - -
24 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.0307 - -
25 - - - 0.0697 - - 0.1007 0.1016 - - - 0.2106 - -
26 - - - 0.1074 - - - - - - - - - -
32 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.1727
34 - 0.0203 - - - - - - - - - - - -
36 - 0.0844 - - - - - - - - - - - -
38 - 0.0716 - - - - - - - - - - - -
39 - 0.0652 - - - - - - 0.2929 0.2946 - - - -
40 - 0.0382 - - - - - - - - - - - -
50 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 0.0012 0.0432 0.0010 0.0232 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0012
TABLE II
SNR WORKING POINTS OF THE CONSIDERED CODING SCHEMES FOR
SEVERAL VALUES OF Rs AND RB ; THE VALUES OF
Eb
N0
ARE IN DB.
Rs RB
Eb
N0
∣
∣
∣
B
th
Eb
N0
∣
∣
∣
F
th
Eb
N0
∣
∣
∣
B
n1
Eb
N0
∣
∣
∣
F
n1
Eb
N0
∣
∣
∣
B
n2
Eb
N0
∣
∣
∣
F
n2
0.33 0.35 -0.14 -1.52 1.10 3.82 0.72 3.18
0.4 0.5 0.41 -0.52 1.00 0.76 0.78 0.44
0.45 0.5 0.42 -0.69 1.12 1.22 0.82 0.98
0.5 0.75 1.73 0.38 2.14 1.17 1.94 0.84
0.6 0.75 1.72 -0.14 2.12 0.98 1.97 0.63
0.7 0.75 1.75 -0.52 2.13 0.91 1.92 0.60
0.725 0.75 1.75 -0.69 2.18 2.11 1.96 1.59
codeword lengths. We have also proposed an optimization
approach to design good codes for this context. Our results
show that these codes are able to approach the ultimate
performance limits even with relatively small block lengths.
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